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I Crim. No. 562L fa Bank. .JII". :?H. Wh5·1

THE PEOPJJg, Uespondcnt, v. JOHNSON WiLLIAM
CALD'VEIJL, Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Murder-Killing hy Torture.-Physical suffering, a
concomitant of almost all violent deaths, is not enough by
itself to show murder by torture; there must also be intent
that victim shall suffer.
f2] Id.-Murder-Killing by Strangulation.-Murder by stl'angulation indicates malice, but it does not by itself indicate intent
to make victim suffer.
l3] Id.-Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-A verdict of
first degree murder for a slaying not committed in perpetrntion of certain enumerated crimes or by means enumerated
in Pen. Code, § 189, is proper only if slayer killed as result
of careful thought and weighing of considerations, as a deliberate judgment or plan, carried on coolly and steadily,
especially according to a preconceived design.
[11] Id.-Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-Use of "wilful, deliberate and premeditated" in Pen. Code, § 189, defining
first degree murder, indicates that Legislature meant, by
reiteration, to emphasize its intent to require, as element of
such offense, considerably more reflection than mere amount
of thought necessary to form intention.
[5] Id.-Murder-Deliberation and Premeditation.-U evidence in
murder case showed no more than infliction of multiple acts
of violence on victim, it would not be sufficient to show that
killing was result of careful thought and weighing of considerations.
[6] Id.-Evidence-Intent and Deliberation.-'fhe deliberation or
premeditation required to sustain conviction of first degree
murder in uxoricide case is sufficiently shown by evidence that
defendant had made prior threats to "knock the old bag in
the head and take off" and to "do her up," that his last thl'eat
before he entered house with his wife on day of homicide
was followed by approximately an hour of argument over
whether or not he should leave her, that this argument termi·
nated in the killing, and that defendant did not terminate
his attack on his wife after he had sufficiently disabled her
so that he could be free to leave as be testified he wanted
to do, but continued attack uutil it culminated in her strangulation.
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[IJ See Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 12 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§ 15.

McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide, § 15; (3-5] Homicide,
§ 15(2); (6] Homicide, § 158.
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.APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b» from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County. Russell S. Waite, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
death penalty, affirmed.
Rubin Tepper, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Norman H.
Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J .-Defendant was charged by information
. with the murder of his wife, Lily Pearl Storts Caldwell, and
with four previous convictions of felony. He pleaded not
guilty to the charge of murder, admitted the convictions.
and waived trial by jury. The court found him guilty of
murder in the first degree and. sentenced him to death.
This appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
In early February, 1954, defendant informed the Arkansas
State Police that he had killed his wife in Riverside, California. An investigation followed and her body was found
in the bathtub in her Riverside cabin. She had been dead
for about five days. The autopsy surgeon testified that th~
body disclosed a single long laceration of the scalp, extending
to but not through the bones of the skull. Round the neck
were two belts. A torn piece of cloth belt, brokeJ. at the
buckle and large enough only to encircle the neck, was next
to the skin and over that was a tightly drawn plastic belt.
It was the opinion of the surgeon that the cause of death
was asphyxiation by strangulation, and that the lacerati~.
though inflicted immediately before strangulation, vu 40t
a contributing cause of death. In the main bedroom were a
2-foot length of iron pipe, two pieces from the cloth belt
that encircled the decedent's throat, and mopped-up blood
staIns. A small black purse was on the bed. It was identified
: as one the decedent usually kept on her person and in which
she usually kept her money. Bedclothing, drapes, wearing
apparel, extra bed springs, boxes, a large can, and miscellaneous articles were piled about the two bedrooms.
In early January, 1954, defendant rented a cabin from
Lily. Within three days, defendant, who was 32 Yf'ars (.ld,
. married Lily, who was 40 to 50 years old and weighed 235
a C.2d-J8
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pounds. Defendant testified that the marriage occurred after
a drinking party, that everyone at the time was intoxicated,
that he did not know why he married Lily, and that she
seemed to be willing to spend her money on him in an effort
to have a good time. Prosecution witnesses testified that
defendant had told them that he had married Lily for her
money and property. During his extradition to California,
he stated that Lily had her eye on a young man, and that
he had his eye on her money.
The marriage was marked by quarrels, attempted separations, and defendant's steady drinking. He testified· that
he was annoyed and embarrassed by her penuriousness, pronounced sexual desires, and her· insistence that he remain
with her constantly rather than work or visit others. Prosecuti8n witnesses related several conversations in which defendant uttered threatening words against Lily. Two or three
weeks after the marriage, Lily had called to defendant, "Come
on, Daddy, let's go." Defendant said to a neighbor, "I'm
a little fed up with it," and continued that he would, "take
her in and do her up." On another occasion, he complained
that Lily did not give him money, and said, "As soon as
she gets me some more money, I am going to do her in."
At a party in celebration of the marriage, defendant was
heard to tell others that he was "getting tired of it," and
that he was going to "knock the old bag in the head and
take off." On the morning of the murder, the witnesses agreed
that defendant and Lily had argued, but they disagreed as
to whether he again expressed an intention to "do her up."
On the occasion of each of these threats, defendant was
described as drinking, drunk, smelling of alcohol, "tight,"
"a little off," "pretty well tight," "a little high," "just
there and drinking," and "pretty much drunk." On crossexamination, one witness stated that he did not regard these
remarks as serious; no one ever bothered to mention them
to Lily.
Defendant testified that one week before the killing he
h.ad attempted to I~ave Lily and that sne spent the afternoon
following him, first to his sister's home, then to that of a
neighbor, pleading with him to return. That evening they
took an auto trip with a neighboring- couple, but continued
to argue. Lily accused defendant of incpgt with his sister;
he struck her in the eye and began to strangle her, but was
stopp<,d by the other man in the car.
On the day befo·re the killing, defendant asked Lily to
supply bail for his friend Cecil, who was in jail. He became
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angry when sh" rl,rm~p.d, st.at.ing that. hp. waR "rrf'f fy ,,",,11
fed up," and that he wonld "knock hpf in t.he hrac1." AeCOlll
panied by Cecil's wiff', \ViJmH, deff'ndant Jeft to raise bail
money, but failing in that objl'ctive or forgetting it, he
and Wilma spent the night together drinking at various publi(~
places and later lodging at a motel. They spoke of going
to Texas together, but never reached an agreement. On the
morning of the killing, defendant and Wilma went to his
sister's home, to a cafe, and then to Lily's cabin. Defendant
testified that he and Wilma commenced drinking immediately
upon awakening. According to both defendant and Wilma,
upon arriving at his sister's home, defendant learned that
Lily had left most of his clothes there and had told his sister
that the marriage was over. Defendant said that he "was
glad of it" but that he wanted to get a pair of pants and
a shirt that Lily had kept. He and 'Vilma went to Lily's
cabin after stopping for a short time at a cafe. The waitress
there testified that defendant bought no drinks, and although
he appeared to have been drinki"ng, he was not boisterous
but was laughing and having a good time. Arriving at
Lily's cabin, defendant and Wilma found that Lily had just
awakened, and that she was angry. She said, "I am glad
yon got what you wanted." At that point, Cecil and two
other persons drove up to the cabin. Defendant asked, "Can
we come in and make some coffee T" Lily said, "No." Wilma
and Ray, one of those who had just arrived, both testified
that Lily and defendant began to argue, but they disagreed
as to what was said. Ray asserted, "He said he was going
to take her in and do her up." Wilma testified that defendant asked, "Do you want me to stay T" that Lily replied,
"Yes," and that he said, "All right, all right, I guess so."
Defendant testified that he and Lily argued, but asserted
that she pleaded with him to remain with her, but that he
insisted on leaving. Ray testified that defendant was "pretty
much" drunk and "tight" at the time. Shortly thereafter,
Wil.m.a.,; Cecil, Ray., and the other visitor m-ove awa.y lea:vmtl
defendant and Lily arguing.
Defendant testified that the argument continued, that he
tried to get his clothes and leave, that Lily grabbed them
from him, that he hit her with his fist and then, grabbing
a piece of pipe from the bedroom floor, hit her on the head.
Tn one of his admissions during the trip from Arkansas to
California he said that he then helped IJily to her feet,
guided, punched, and pushed her to the bathroom, pushed
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tllh, lock('d thp bathroom door, and Idt th"
At. tlw trinl h(' testified, "I know I just went
crazy. (hit h('r on the jaw and knocked her down., and
she got up and turned around and carne at me with her
hand raised. 'Yell, I hit her again; and this little old pipe
was there . . . I grabbed that, and I remember hitting her
one time."
He testified that he did not remember much
after that, except that he shut the bathroom door when Lily
was in the tub, took $24 from Lily's small purse, looked
lInder the front room couch for more money, and departed
in IJily's car. He asserted in his deposition given in Arkansas,
in his admissions during the trip from Arkansas to California.
Ilnd in his testimony at the trial that he did not remember
putting the belts on his wife's neck. He did admit, however,
that he could have strangled her, but that he did not rememher it.
In the afternoon of the day of the killing, defendant met
Cecil and Wilma at a cafe. He was asked about blood on
h is clothes, and replied that he had punched his wife in
t he nose.
The waitress testified that he appeared to have
been drinking, was in a good mood, bought three beers, and
offered to sell her a piano and a lawnmower. When asked
about his wife, he declared, "She is passed out; she is all
sprawled out." Defendant testified that he did not return
to Lily's cabin, but a neighbor testified that he saw defendant
on the front porch between 9 :30 and 10 that night, and
that shortly thereafter Lily's auto was driven away. Defendant admitted selling a lawnmower that belonged to Lily
and driving through Arizona, where he changed license plates,
and into Arkansas, where he confessed when stopped for an
auto registration inspection. He declared that he financed
the trip by picking up hitchhikers and selling accessories
from the automobile.
The basic issue on this appeal is whether the killing was
murder in the first degree. It was murder in the first degree
if it was committed in the perpetration of robbery, committed
by torture, or if it was wilful, deliberate, and premeditated.
(Pen. Code, § 189.) The question of whether it was committed
in the perpetration of robbery is not before us, since the
trial court expressly withheld a decision on that question,
stating that it was "unnecessary to decide, as a question
of fact, at this time whether or not this killing was perpetrated in an attempt to commit robbery, or in the
commission of robbery or burglary, or any other offense."
[1] Physical suffering, a concomitant of almost all violent
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deaths, is not enough by itself to show murder by torture.
There must also be intent that the victim shall suffer. (People
v. Daugherty, 40 Ca1.2d 876 [256 P.2d 911J.) [2] Murder by
strangulation indicates malice, but it does not by itself indio
cate an intent to make the victim suffer. (People v. Bender,
27 Ca1.2d 164, 177 [163 P.2d 8].) There is no evidence in
this case that defendant had such intent.
The judgment can be sustained, therefore, only if the
evidence supports the conclusion that the killing was
deliberate and premeditated. [3] A verdict of murder in
the first degree for a slaying not committed in the perpetration of certain enumerated crimes, or by means enumerated
in Penal Code section 189, is proper only if the slayer killed
"as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations; as a deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly
and steadily, esp. according to a preconceived design."
(People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 183 [163 P.2d 8].)
[4] ,. fi:urther, the use of 'wilful, deliberate, and premedi.
tated' in conjunction would seem 'to indicate that the legislature meant, by reiteration, to emphasize its intent to require,
8S an element of first degree murder, considerably more
reflection than the mere amount of thought necessary to form
the intention." (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 87 [153
P.2d 21].)
[5] If the evidence showed no more than the infliction
of mUltiple acts of violence on the victim, it would not be
sufficient to show that the killing was the result of careful
thought and weighing of considerations. (People v. Tubby,
34 Cal.2d 72, 78-79 [207 P.2d 51]; People v. Bender, 27
Ca1.2d 164, 170, 186 [163 P.2d 8].) [6] In the present
case, however, the circumstances attending the killing itself
cannot be divorced from defendant's threats to "knock the old
bag in the head and take oif," and to "do her up." Whetber
or not these threats were the result of serious contemplation
before they were made, they at least justify the inference
that defendant considered killing his wife when he felt "fed
up" and wished to leave her. Defendant's last threat before
he entered the house with his wife on the day of the homicide
was followed by approximately an hour of argument over
whether or not he should leave her, and this argument termi·
natf'd in the killing. The trial court could reasonably conclude
that during this period, when defendant's thoughts were
directed to the question of whether he should leave, he also
weighed and considered the question of wbether he should
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kill. These questions had been associated in defenda::J.t's mind
in the past, and there is no reason to believe that they were
not so associated and reflected upon for the period of approximately an hour that he and his wife argued before her death.
Our conclusion that the evidence supports the judgment is
not inconsistent with People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59 [153 P.2d
21]. It is true that in the Holt ease, as in this case, defendant
threatened to kill the deceased approximately an hour before
he did so. In the Holt case the court recognized that such
a threat followed by a killing, standing alone, would justify
a finding of first degree murder. There was other evidence
in that ease, however, that did more than create a conflict
with the inference that might be drawn from the threat
followed by the killing; it was sufficient to establish as a
matter of law that the threat was of no significance. In
particular the court relied upon the fact that defendant with
eight loaded cartridges remaining in his rifle stopped firing
when the deceased stopped advancing toward him and that
he then permitted the decf'ased to turn and walk away. In
the present case, on the contrary, defendant did not terminate
his attack on his wife after he had sufficiently disabled her
so that he would be free to leave as he testified he wanted
to do, but continued the attack until it culminated in her
strangulation. Under these circumstances we cannot say
as a matter of law that the threats were of no significance.
_ The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment
of conviction. Certainly, Caldwell's threats to take Lily's
life, followed by his killing of her, give rise to an inference
that the murder was premeditated. In my opinion, however,
that conclusion is inconsistent with People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d
59 [153 P.2d 21], where the defendant made similar threats
before taking the life of his victim. The Holt case is distinguished upon the ground that, after firing the lethal bullet,
Holt "with eight loaded cartridges remaining in his rifle
stopped firing . . . and . . . permitted the deceased to turn
and walk away." But evidence of the activities of the accused after he shot the victim or inflicted a lethal blow, to
the extent that it bears at all upon the question of premeditation, could create only a conflict.
In view of the present decision, the Holt case should be
overruled.

